Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical Origins of the Commercial Speech Doctrine by Rotunda, Ronald D.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 1 Article 6
2002
Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical Origins
of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Ronald D. Rotunda
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical Origins of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 91 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/6
LAWYER ADVERTISING AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL
ORIGINS OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Ronald D. Rotunda*
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of lawyers advertising for clients seems prosaic
enough, but it is really a subset of a much larger, more theoretical
question. What Americans think about the Constitutional right of
lawyers to advertise and market their services both reflects and
molds what we think about the right to be left alone. In 1928,
Justice Brandeis, in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,1 wrote that our Constitution "conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be left alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."2 Justice
Brandeis did not speak in a vacuum; he was building on the phi-
losophical arguments that originated in the debates between Ar-
istotle and Socrates.
Brandeis first turned to this topic nearly forty years earlier, in
his seminal article on the subject.3 The passage of time gave him
no solace but only reinforced his dread that the future would
bring new assaults on the right to be left alone. His contemporar-
ies shared his fears. Only a few years after Brandeis' death,
George Orwell published his own chilling vision of the future,
1984.4
* The Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, The University of Illinois College of
Law. The author is indebted to Professor Thomas Ulen of the University of Illinois and
Roger Pilon and Bob Levy, both of the Cato Institute, for their helpful comments.
1. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
2. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890) (discussing privacy).
4. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). Brandeis died in 1941, after leaving the Supreme
Court in 1939.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
It was no coincidence that Brandeis, the proponent of the right
to be left alone, was also a strong proponent of free speech. The
right to have the government leave its citizens alone implies that
it should not be able to influence or manipulate what its citizens
do or think by denying them access to truthful information. For
Brandeis, unless there was an emergency requiring immediate
action-in other words, if there was time to avert any perceived
evil by the processes of education-the only permissible govern-
ment remedy was "more speech, not enforced silence."5 To give
the government the power to prevent us from hearing the truth
"for our own good" is to treat adults like children.
A half-century later, Justice William 0. Douglas, like Brandeis
before him, connected the right to be left alone with the right of
free speech. Justice Douglas, in Schneider v. Smith,6 held that
"[tihe purpose of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, unlike more
recent models promoting a welfare state, was to take the govern-
ment off the backs of people."7 Four years later, Justice Douglas
elaborated that:
One's hair style, like one's taste for food, or one's liking for certain
kinds of music, art, reading, recreation, is certainly fundamental in
our constitutional scheme-a scheme designed to keep government
off the backs of people. That is not to say that the police power of the
state is powerless to deal with known evils. An epidemic of lice might
conceivab e authorize a shearing of locks. Other like crises might be
imagined.
5. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1925) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concur-
ring).
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They
did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To
courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless
reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of
the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is oppor-
tunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the rem-
edy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can
justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with
freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution. It is there-
fore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and
assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
6. 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
7. Id. at 25.
8. Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1044 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (footnote omitted).
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Others believe that the right of free speech should prohibit the
government from restricting truthful speech (e.g., advertising) in
order to influence or modify an individual's right to decide for
herself whether to use a lawful product or service.9 But this view
is hardly an axiom of modern government. Justice Brandeis' pre-
ferred remedy---"more speech, not enforced silence"' ° -is the sub-
ject of much controversy. Hence the question: To what extent
should the government be able to restrict truthful advertising in
order to manipulate behavior, or does our right to be left alone
limit such power?
For example, if the government wants to encourage people to
use less electricity, it might decide on an educational campaign
against wasteful energy use." Or, the government might require
products to disclose how fuel-efficient they are. 2 Or it might in-
crease the tax on electricity, thus lowering demand because that
is the result of a price increase.
None of these tools restrict truthful speech. Some of the tools
have budgetary consequences (like raising taxes), which is why
the government may not prefer them. When the government uses
any of these tools, what it does is out in the open, for all to see so
that they may evaluate the costs and benefits. But, as Justice
Blackmun pointed out, when the legislature restricts speech, "the
State's policy choices are insulated from the visibility and scru-
tiny that direct regulation would entail and the conduct of citi-
9. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE
VALUES OF DEMOCRACY (2001); William Van Alstyne, Quo Vadis, Posadas?, 25 N. KY. L.
REV. 505 (1998); Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Re-
placing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relations Framework, 41 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1093 (1991) (arguing that the Commercial Speech doctrine should be
abandoned because it justifies certain governmental restrictions that cut against the pol-
icy of content neutrality that lies at the heart of the First Amendment); Alex Kozinski &
Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990); Rodney A.
Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection
of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 777, 780-81 (1993) ("In classic First Amendment
terms... the one thing the government may not do is regulate speech because it 'sells' a
lifestyle, fantasy, ethos, identity, or attitude that happens to be regarded by most as so-
cially corrosive.").
10. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
11 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (involving a state ban on promotional advertising by a public utility).
12. See id. at 565 (noting that the Court, in a previous case, 'did not foreclose the pos-
sibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like,
might be required' in promotional materials." (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 384 (1977))).
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zens is molded by the information that government chooses to
give them."13 Thus, Justice Blackmun argued that it was wrong
for the state to engage in "a covert attempt... to manipulate the
choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but
by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free
choice." 4
Given the tools that the government already has at its disposal,
should it also be empowered to prohibit truthful advertising that
promotes the use of electricity?" Modern government has an ar-
senal of weapons at its disposal to control, regulate, or modify the
behavior of its citizens. May the government add to this arsenal a
new weapon-the power to restrict truthful speech that promotes
the use of lawful goods and services? 6
If the First Amendment allows the government to restrict
truthful speech that may affect an individual's right to decide
whether to use more electricity, the government should not be ex-
pected to limit the application of this new power to electrical en-
ergy and voltage alone. The government would have a similar
power to restrict truthful advertising of other legally available
goods and services, such as advertising affecting an individual's
right to decide whether to hire a lawyer or which lawyer to hire;
or advertising promoting a risky activity, such as high diving or
motorcycling; or advertising that promotes legally available but
unhealthy products, such as high-calorie foods, drinks containing
a lot of sugar or caffeine, or beer containing more alcohol than
regular beer.'7
13. Id. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Ronald D. Rotunda, The Commer-
cial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080, 1080-83 (1976)).
14. Id.
15. The decision in Central Hudson invalidated such a state restriction on First
Amendment grounds. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun wrote:
I seriously doubt whether suppression of information concerning the avail-
ability and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the
State to "dampen" demand for or use of the product. Even though "commer-
cial" speech is involved, such a regulatory measure strikes at the heart of the
First Amendment.
Id. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Note that the majority in Central Hudson did not
adopt this blanket principle.
16. See Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167,
1188 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Coures commercial advertising cases are "mis-
guided").
17. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (involving a federal law
that prohibited beer labels-but not wine or hard liquor labels--from truthfully displaying
[Vol. 36:91
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Before we turn to these questions, we should realize that, in
seeking their answers, almost all of us are prisoners of our cul-
ture. It is difficult for us to think outside of the box. What today
we regard as normal, our predecessors regarded as revolutionary.
All ideas seem to follow a path that starts with a road sign that
says, "This is obviously wrong," and ends with another sign that
says, "This is obviously correct." If we see farther than our ances-
tors it is not because we are smarter than they were but because
we live in a different era; we have had more time to think about
the problem and to learn from their mistakes.
For example, today we would like to think that if we had been
judges or political leaders during the 1950s, we would have re-
sisted efforts to prosecute people because of their political speech,
speech now protected by the First Amendment." But would most
of us really be any different if we lived during that time? We
would like to think so, but we cannot really know. In 1951, no less
a Justice than Felix Frankfurter piously criticized Gitlow v. New
York 9 as insufficiently protective of free speech, while simultane-
ously supporting the similar restriction on free speech upheld in
Dennis v. United States.
20
In Gitlow, the Supreme Court had affirmed the felony convic-
tion of defendants who had published a radical manifesto urging
"mass political strikes and 'revolutionary mass action' for the
purpose of conquering and destroying the parliamentary state."2'
In Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Dennis, he concluded that
the ascendancy of the Communist threat in the 1950s was impor-
tant enough to justify restrictions on free speech, while the ear-
lier restrictions on free speech in the 1920s were not.2 2 "In con-
trast" to Gitlow, Frankfurter stated, "there is ample justification
alcohol content).
18. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (striking down a
state statute prohibiting the advocacy of crime or violence as a means of accomplishing
industrial or political reform).
19. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
20. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
21. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 658.
22. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 541-42 (Frankfuter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter
stated that the appropriate test to apply to political speech was not the "clear and present
danger" test, but rather a "candid and informed weighing of the competing interests," and
that this balancing test should be performed by Congress, not the judiciary. Id. at 525
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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for a legislative judgment that the conspiracy now before us is a
substantial threat to national order and security."
23
The previous generation believed that the threat in Gitlow was
serious enough, just as Frankfurter's generation believed that the
Communist threat was serious enough. In the name of free
speech, every generation thinks that the villains it faces and the
dragons it must slay are real and the threats are substantial,
even if the prior generation overreacted to the same villains and
dragons. The genuine heroes were people like Justices Brandeis
or Holmes who dissented in Gitlow.24 They escaped the prison of
their culture, and they saw much further than their contemporar-
ies. Like Columbus, they saw the horizon and realized that it did
not mark the end of the world, only the farthest that one could
see from the present vantage point.
Judges, like every other individual, face the challenge of think-
ing outside the box when they confront rules that restrict speech
for reasons that-at the time-are popular and appear to be of
unquestionable validity.
The challenge to think outside the prison of our present culture
is more difficult when judges rule on speech that relates to law-
yers or judges. When this occurs, judges face two prisons: the
prison of our culture and the prison of lawyer culture. Restric-
tions on other professions or businesses may be appropriate, but
lawyers believe that lawyers and the law are different. When
lawyers become judges they still think like lawyers.
Consider Cordova v. Bache & Co.2" The judge who wrote the
opinion was the very well-respected Walter R. Mansfield, who
later rose to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.26 In Cordova,
Judge Mansfield held that a provision of the Clayton Antitrust
23. Id. at 524. Justice Frankfurter elaborated that
[iut requires excessive tolerance of the legislative judgment to suppose that
the Gitlow publication in the circumstances could justify serious concern. In
contrast, there is ample justification for a legislative judgment that the con-
spiracy now before us is a substantial threat to national order and security. If
the Smith Act is justified at all, it is justified precisely because it may serve
to prohibit the type of conspiracy for which these defendants were convicted.
Id. at 541-42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
24. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
25. 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
26. Ronald D. Rotunda, Remembering Judge Walter R. Mansfield, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
271, 271 (1987).
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Act exempting labor and similar organizations from antitrust
laws did not exempt multi-employer units with respect to con-
certed action in reducing compensation.27 Cordova involved secu-
rities representatives who charged their employers (approxi-
mately forty-two leading stock exchange brokerage firms and the
New York Stock Exchange) with conspiracy to reduce commis-
sions paid to representatives in violation of the antitrust laws.28
The principle that one may engage in free speech but one may not
conspire to set prices is well-grounded in precedent. 29 This deci-
sion is a logical elaboration of prior case law.
Interestingly, in the course of this opinion, Judge Mansfield is-
sued what might be called "factual dictum." ° First, the judge con-
cluded:
There can be little doubt about the fact that if a group of employ-
ers, as the complaint here alleges, were allowed, not as part of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, to agree together to reduce the com-
missions paid to their respective employees, they would have the
same power to restrain competition as is inherent in a price-fixing
agreement. In a market where the demand for employees with par-
ticular skills exceeded the supply, employers could serve their mu-
tual interests by jointly establishing a "going rate" which none would
violate, thereby eliminating wage competition between them.
3 1
At the end of the last sentence, Judge Mansfield added an im-
portant footnote that announced a factual distinction:
This, of course, is to be distinguished from a "going rate" resulting
from competition between employers, such as the initial salaries paid
by large law firms to law school graduates hired by them.32
The judge declared that the facts that create an antitrust viola-
tion do not apply if the participants are engaged in the practice of
law because those rates "result from competition."33 Thus, under
this view of the law, there are no antitrust violations if a group of
27. Cordova, 321 F. Supp. at 608.
28. Id. at 603.
29. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (involving methods
of competition, such as local pricefixing at points where necessary to suppress competi-
tion); see also WILLIAM R. ANDERSON & C. PAUL ROGERS III, ANTITRUST LAw: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 47 (1985).
30. Cordova, 321 F. Supp. at 606-07.
31. Id. at 606.
32. Id. at 607 n.2 (second emphasis added).
33. Id. at 607.
20021
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New York law firms meet and decide to set the going rate for new
associates. Why is this practice different from other employers
fixing commissions paid to brokers? Because this factual situation
"of course, is to be distinguished."34
I have discovered over the years that the use of the words "of
course" or "obviously" in a court decision often signals a state-
ment for which the judge authoring the statement has no sup-
port. By calling it "obvious," the judge perhaps hopes that the
reader will be too embarrassed to challenge the bald assertion.
You should understand that my point is "obviously" correct.
Why should law firms have the right to set the prices paid to
their employees? This question was answered only a few years
later when the United States Supreme Court made it clear that
price-fixing by law firms does violate antitrust laws.35
Judge Mansfield, like many other judges and commentators,
assumed that the practice of law is different from other commer-
cial activities, and should therefore be subject to different rules.36
It would be difficult for professionals other than lawyers to un-
derstand why medical doctors or certified public accountants en-
joy a First Amendment right to advertise and engage in face-to-
face solicitation of business that extends further than the right of
lawyers. In the past, the Court explained that CPAs have such a
right because the practice of law is "different"37 from other profes-
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781-82 (1975) (holding that it is ille-
gal price-fixing for law firms to agree to minimum-fee schedules for services offered to cli-
ents). Law firms have objected to paying young associates such high salaries, but if the
law firms agreed to lower starting salaries, would they take the money that they save and
give it to their corporate clients as refunds? See Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionals, Prag-
matists or Predators, 75 ILL. BAR J. pt. I at 420 (1987); id. pt. I at 482, 540.
36. See Cordova, 321 F. Supp. at 607.
37. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774 (1993). In Fane, the issue was Florida's
regulation of the personal solicitation of business clients by CPAs. The plaintiff sued for
the right to make unsolicited calls to clients and to arrange appointments to explain his
expertise and lower fees. Id. at 764. The State argued that the rule against such contacts
was designed to protect consumers of accounting services against overreaching and also to
assure the independence of financial audits. Id. at 768. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy found that the State's interests were "substantial in the abstract," but that busi-
ness clients should have the ability to protect themselves against overreaching. Id. at 770,
775-76. Moreover, to the extent that one is concerned about a lack of audit independence,
the Court felt that such concern is likely to be greater when businesses cannot turn to
newcomers like Fane, because then the incumbent CPA firms could get too close to man-
agement. Id. at 772-73.
The State relied on Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), which upheld
[Vol. 36:91
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sions. However, if CPAs rather than lawyers sat on the United
States Supreme Court, decisions governing the free speech of
CPAs might well be different.
The distinctions previously drawn by the Court raise numerous
questions regarding the regulatory powers of the government. For
example, to what extent should it able to control or manipulate
our behavior by keeping us from listening to, and being per-
suaded by, truthful speech? How much power does the govern-
ment have to regulate and limit what we can read and hear? Does
the First Amendment, which applies to the federal government
directly and to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, limit
the power of government to regulate truthful advertising about
lawful products or services? These questions reflect an age-old
controversy that predates our Constitution." Indeed, as discussed
below, this debate goes back at least as far as the philosophical
disputations between Aristotle and Socrates. 9
To better understand the decades-long controversy over lawyer
advertising, it is important to revisit the origins of the modern
commercial speech doctrine. °
II. THE ROAD TO THE PRESENT COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court originally granted no protection for what it
calls "commercial speech." The Court, in Valentine v. Chresten-
sen,41 announced that "commercial speech" is not "speech" within
the power of the state to prohibit lawyers from engaging in face-to-face solicitation. Fane
expressly distinguished Ohralik as a case where the "holding was narrow and depended
upon certain 'unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers' that were present in the
circumstances of that case." Fane, 507 U.S. at 774 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
CPAs, the Court observed, are not "trained in the art of persuasion." Id. at 775 (quoting
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465). Moreover, the clients being solicited "are sophisticated and ex-
perienced business executives who understand well the services that a CPA offers." Id.
Yes, lawyers are different. Of course, some CPAs are also lawyers and are as trained as
other lawyers in the "art of persuasion." Law professors know that not all lawyers are
trained in the art of persuasion. But that is not important because lawyers are different.
38. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
39. See STONE, infra note 115; see also ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
The Modem Library 1943).
40. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILT §§ 46-1 to 51-4 (2000).
41. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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the meaning of the First Amendment.42 Thus, the birth of com-
mercial speech may be compared to an immaculate conception:
there was no father-the Court simply announced the new rule.
Valentine upheld the conviction of an entrepreneur for violat-
ing a sanitary code provision that forbade distributing leaflets in
the streets.4 One side of the leaflet contained an advertisement
for a commercial exhibition of a former Navy submarine.' The
other side contained a protest against the City's denial of wharf
facilities for the exhibition.45 The Court, with little discussion and
no dissents, announced that the First Amendment imposed "no
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertis-
ing."46 Commercial speech was effectively excluded from the pro-
tection of the First Amendment.17
The Court did not question this pronouncement until Bigelow
v. Virginia,' decided three decades later. The managing editor of
a weekly Virginia newspaper published a New York City organi-
zation's advertisement offering to arrange low-cost placements for
women with unwanted pregnancies in accredited hospitals and
clinics in New York.49 He appealed his conviction for violating a
law that outlawed advertisements designed to "encourage or
prompt the procuring of abortion" on the grounds that the profit-
making abortion organization truthfully advertised a lawful ser-
vice offered in another state.5" The Court held that, although the
advertisement was "commercial" in nature (i.e., it was not an edi-
torial), the free speech guarantee contained in the First Amend-
ment nevertheless embraced it and, therefore, granted some pro-
tection.5 Consequently, the Court overturned the conviction.52
The protections recognized in Bigelow were initially inter-
preted by some to be limited to abortion cases. 3 The fact that
42. Id. at 54.
43. Id. at 55.
44. Id. at 53.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 54.
47. See id.
48. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
49. Id. at 811-12.
50. Id. at 812-13.
51. Id. at 818.
52. Id. at 829.
53. See Jeffrey Brandt, Attorney In-Person Solicitation: Hope for a New Direction and
[Vol. 36:91
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Justice Blackmun authored the Bigelow opinion two years after
he wrote the landmark opinion in Roe v. Wade54 supported this
view. However, Bigelow was not expressly limited to cases involv-
ing abortion rights. Furthermore, the Court later clarified that
protections of free speech would include all forms of commercial
speech.5
III. DEFINING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Since its tentative beginnings in Bigelow, the' Court has ex-
plained that commercial speech is afforded some First Amend-
ment protection; however, this protection has not reached the
same level of protection afforded "political" speech.5" The distinc-
tion between "commercial" and "noncommercial" speech has not
been demarcated with any great precision, nor defined by the
Court with any rigor." Instead, the Court repeatedly claims there
is a "commonsense"" distinction between speech that merely pro-
poses a commercial transaction and other guaranteed forms of
expression.5 9
The Court's assumption that "commercial" speech is really dif-
ferent in kind from "political" speech and deserving of lessened
protection is hardly self-evident. One wonders why there is more
protection for someone who sells himself as 'Presidential timber"
Supreme Court Protection After Edenfield v. Fane, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 783, 786 n.27 (1994).
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. Ronald D. Rotunda, The First Amendment Now Protects Commercial Speech, 10
THE CENTER MAG. 32 (1977); see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2031 (3d ed. 1999).
56. E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 n.24 (1976).
57. See id.
58. Id. at 771-72 n.24. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court stated:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protec-
tion, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms.
There are commonsense differences between speech that does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction" .... The truth of commercial speech, for
example, may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say,
news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser
seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he
himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else.
Id. (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
59. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
20021
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("Jones has the right stuff and cares about the voter") than for
one who sells timber ("The XYZ Timber Co. cares about the envi-
ronment"). Why is there less protection for Pepsi when it claims,
"It's the right one baby," than when the Democratic Party claims
that it is "the party of the people?" When the New York Times
calls itself "the paper of record," is it exercising the right of the
press, i.e., the sale of a daily newspaper by a profit-making, pub-
licly traded corporation? Or is it proposing a commercial transac-
tion? What about an advertisement for a political book, or a bill-
board promoting a political event, or the sale of campaign buttons
advancing a political cause?
Statements such as "It's the right one baby" intend to create a
certain mood or feeling that may be difficult to verify: what ex-
actly is the "the right one baby" or the candidate with "the right
stuff?" Unlike statements such as "Attend this political event,"
they do not urge people to take specific action, although they may
expect certain action to follow-buying the soft drink, voting for
the candidate, buying the newspaper or the political book, or at-
tending the political event. In both sets of cases (one commercial,
the other political), the speaker may be equally motivated by
profit.
Exactly when does speech become "commercial?" The economic
motive of the speaker cannot be the touchstone, because the New
York Times has an economic motive to sell newspapers; it is, after
all, a publicly traded corporation. If economic motivation makes
speech less deserving of constitutional protection, then authors,
playwrights, composers, and other artists who sell their works
would be correspondingly disadvantaged. Consequently, some
commentators have attacked the political/commercial distinc-
tion.6" However, the Court continues to recognize a difference be-
tween commercial and political speech and, for purposes of this
analysis, we must accept its existence.
The underlying assumption, therefore, must be that lawyer ad-
vertising is "commercial speech" even if the purpose of the speech
60. See, e.g., Jonathan W. Emord, Contrived Distinctions: The Doctrine of Commercial
Speech in First Amendment Jurisprudence, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 161 (Sept. 23,
1991). See generally NICHOLAS WOLFSON, FREE SPEECH, FREE MARKETS, AND FOOLISH
INCONSISTENCY (1990) (arguing that because political speech does not necessarily lead to
reasoned outcomes, it should not be afforded more protection than commercial speech).
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is to enable persons to find lawyers so that they may "petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."6
IV. REGULATING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. Misleading Commercial Speech
The United States Supreme Court permits the government to
regulate commercial speech-for example, a television commer-
cial or a newspaper advertisement-if the regulation is intended
to prevent fraudulent or misleading speech or speech that pro-
poses an illegal transaction.62 The government may prohibit ad-
vertisements that solicit murder, or that seek to hire "a white
male," because these are legislatively defined illegal activities.63
Under the First Amendment, the government has less power to
regulate political speech than it has to regulate commercial
speech.' Consequently, a state cannot prohibit a misleading po-
litical advertisement because it is political speech. 61 The govern-
ment may, however, regulate speech that is purely commercial if
the speech is misleading.6 6 The commercial speech must be de-
monstrably false or misleading to warrant such regulation.67
For example, in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission,8 the Court held that Illinois violated the First
Amendment when it disciplined a lawyer who had truthfully de-
clared on his letterhead that the National Board of Trial Advo-
cacy had certified him as a civil trial specialist.69 The Board, a
bona fide private group, developed a set of objective and demand-
61. U.S. CONST. amend I.
62. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
462-65 (1978).
63. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388 ("Discrimination in employment is not only
commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity.. ").
64. E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 (discussing the distinction).
65. See id.
66. E.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 106
(1990).
67. Id.
68. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
69. Id. at 111.
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ing standards and procedures to certify lawyers with experience
and competence in trial work.7"
Illinois claimed this lawyer's letterhead was sufficient to "mis-
lead" the public because it implied a higher standard of quality
than non-certified lawyers possessed.7' However, the implication
that one might draw from the letterhead's factual statement may,
in fact, be true. The Peel case illuminates one conundrum sur-
rounding the regulation of truthful, but potentially misleading
commercial speech. For instance, a restaurant may truthfully
claim that it has a Michelin four-star rating, or a hotel may truth-
fully claim that the AAA rates it highly. These statements are no
more misleading than a lawyer's factual claim that a bona fide
organization has certified a lawyer as meeting special qualifica-
tions. The lawyer simply made a statement of an objective, verifi-
able fact-that a bona fide independent group has rated that law-
yer very highly, and this fact "may support an inference of
quality."72
Similarly, the lawyer may claim that he or she graduated from
the University of Richmond, or is active in the state bar, or used
to hold a high position in the Department of Justice. These are all
verifiable facts from which people may draw an inference of qual-
ity if they choose to do so.
Illinois argued that the lawyer's statement was misleading be-
cause it implied that the State recognized or certified special-
ists.73 Since Illinois did not certify any lawyer specialists, the
State claimed Mr. Peel was making a false claim.74 But Mr. Peel
made no claims that the State of Illinois certified him. 5 Instead,
he truthfully stated that the National Board of Trial Advocacy
certified him.76 Hence, Illinois' argument boiled down to the idea
that the word "certified" implied that only the government certi-
fies.77
70. Id. at 102.
71. Id. at 98-99.
72. Id. at 101. Hence, any advertising that the government prohibits as misleading
must be truly misleading.
73. Id. at 99.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 101.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 103.
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The Illinois Supreme Court adopted this position, and-to but-
tress its point-cited a dictionary to prove what "certificate"
means.7 The court quoted from the dictionary definition of "cer-
tificate," but, first, it "ellipsed out" the words below that have
been reprinted in italics. 9 A certificate is a
document issued by a school, a state agency, or a professional or-
ganization certifying that one has satisfactorily completed a course of
studies, has passed a qualifying examination, or has attained profes-
sional standing in a given field and may officially practice or hold a
position in that field. 
°
What the Illinois Supreme Court did bears repeating. In an ef-
fort to find evidence that a lawyer had engaged in misleading
speech, the state court turned to the dictionary, and-when the
dictionary did not support the conclusion desired-the court "el-
lipsed out" the inconvenient words.8 ' There is an irony in what
the state court did. While criticizing this lawyer for misleading by
implication, the court was misleading by misquoting.s2
The full dictionary quotation reflects the common sense fact
that private groups issue certificates all the time, and that con-
sumers are aware of this. For example, a golf course may certify a
hole in one, or a private school may issue a certificate to com-
memorate perfect attendance. An auto mechanic may proclaim
that he has a "Mercedes certificate as an air conditioning special-
ist." It is not inherently misleading or confusing to claim truth-
fully that one is certified by a bona fide private organization. 3
Nonetheless, some states seek to prohibit speech on the grounds
that it is misleading, even when the statements are factually
true. Consider, for example, In re R.M.J.,' in which a lawyer
truthfully advertised that he was a member of the United States
Supreme Court Bar.85 Missouri sought to discipline the lawyer on
the grounds that, while what he said was technically true, it
"could be misleading to the general public unfamiliar with the re-
78. Id.
79. Id. at 104.
80. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 367 (1986 ed.) (emphasis
added).
81. In re Peel, 534 N.E.2d 980, 984 (Ill. 1989).
82. See id.
83. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 102-03.
84. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
85. Id. at 197.
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quirements of admission to the Bar of this Court."86 In other
words, lawyers are aware that the Supreme Court's admission of
a lawyer to its Bar implies no special competence, but general
consumers might not be aware of this and, therefore, the adver-
tisement might lead them to draw an incorrect conclusion.
Notwithstanding this argument, the Court held that Missouri's
absolute prohibition of this advertisement violated the First
Amendment because there was no finding in the record specifi-
cally identifying the information as misleading." Moreover, re-
strictions short of absolute prohibitions-for example, requiring a
statement explaining the meaning of admission to the Supreme
Court Bar-may have sufficed to cure any possible deception.'
The Court explained that the protection of free speech ensures
that government regulation of commercial speech is not more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve the asserted governmental inter-
est.89
The Court's decision also discussed the state supreme court's
reprimand of the attorney (identified as "R.M.J") for deviating
from the precise listing of areas of practice.90 For example, his ad-
vertisement listed his areas of practice as including "real estate,"
but the state rule required the use of the term of "property."9' He
also used the term "contracts," but the state rule did not allow
that term at all.92 Hence, the advertisement was deemed "mis-
leading" by the Missouri court.9
The United States Supreme Court required Missouri to demon-
strate that R.M.J.'s listings were deceptive. 9 The Court stated
that the state's mere assertion that the advertisements were mis-
leading was insufficient to justify the prohibition. 95 Because the
86. Id. at 205.
87. Id. at 205-06.
88. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 197.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 205.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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burden could not be met, the Court declared the regulation inva-
lid.9 6
The R.M.J Court did not hold that the rule was unconstitu-
tional as applied to R.M.J" Rather, the Court simply invalidated
the rule altogether. As a logical matter, the Court held that
there is nothing misleading about a lawyer representing that he
or she does work in the area of real estate, if, in fact, the lawyer
does work in that area.99 The state could not avoid constitutional
free speech requirements by announcing that "real estate" was
misleading because the lawyer should have used the term "prop-
erty. ,' 00
Some countries do not embrace the same free speech protec-
tions found in America and make the same mistake as the Mis-
souri and Illinois Supreme Courts: they announce that a form of
communication is "misleading" and therefore should be banned.
For example, in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney-General),1 1
the Canadian Supreme Court concluded that television advertis-
ing directed at children is "per se manipulative" because children
are young and impressionable.0 2
If a statement is "per se manipulative" because children are
young and impressionable, it is difficult to understand its logic.
First, anyone who is a parent knows that children generally are
not that easily influenced or impressionable. If they were, it
would be simple to train them to say "please" and "thank you."
Moreover, if children are so easy to convince and manipulate,
should not Irwin Toy equally presume that they will believe their
parents (the real purchasers of the advertised toys), when their
96. Id. at 207.
97. Id. at 206-07.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 204.
100. Id.
101. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (Can.).
102. Id. at 988. Oddly enough, in Irwin Toy, the Canadian court relied on a report of
the Federal Trade Commission stating: 'The report [of the FTC of the United States] thus
provides a sound basis on which to conclude that television advertising directed at chil-
dren is per se manipulative. Such advertising aims to promote products by convincing
those who will always believe." Id. American courts, however, do not accept that report as
justifying a similar restriction in the United States.
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parents tell them that the toys are too expensive, or are not ap-
propriate for their age, and so forth?
Why is it that the Irwin Toy court concluded that children-as
a matter of law-are easily impressed by what they see and hear
on television but not by what they hear from their parents?
10 3 If
children are so impressed with what is on television, the govern-
ment could easily control them by putting its own advertisements
on television urging children to obey their parents and to never be
peevish. The cure for the speech we do not like should be "more
speech, not enforced silence."0 4
In short, a state may regulate and punish "misleading" com-
mercial speech, but only if the speech is truly misleading. °5 It
should not be enough for the government to claim that people
might be misled, or that children might not understand."6
B. Speech Soliciting a Crime
A state may forbid speech that advertises unlawful activity.0 7
Because the act is declared unlawful, the government may also
prohibit solicitation to commit an illegal act.' Otherwise, con-
tract murderers would be able to freely advertise their services.
Thus, the Court has held that speech that promotes an illegal ac-
tivity-such as advertising for burglary tools, or for "men only"
jobs in violation of sex discrimination laws when sex is not a bona
fide occupational qualification-is not protected speech.'0 9 There
is no danger that the legislature is prohibiting the speech in order
to regulate otherwise lawful behavior because the speech itself is
soliciting a response that is unlawful."0
103. See id.
104. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1925) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concur-
ring).
105. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 102-03
(1990); R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205-06.
106. See Irwin Toy [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 988.
107. E.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389
(1973).
108. Id. at 388.
109. Id. at 376.
110. See id. at 388-89.
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The mirror image to this proposition would be a rule that a
state may not forbid truthful advertising promoting legal activi-
ties. For example, during Prohibition, a state could forbid adver-
tising that promoted speakeasies because it was illegal to offer or
sell intoxicating liquor."' After Prohibition, nightclubs serving
liquor were able to freely engage in non-misleading advertise-
ments that disclosed that they were offering or selling intoxicat-
ing liquor.1
2
Oddly enough, the United States Supreme Court has never
specifically held that the state may not forbid truthful speech
about lawful activities. Furthermore, the Irwin Toy case in Can-
ada has its admirers in this country.13 Devotees of government
regulation of commercial speech would like to control what others
do by regulating what they can see, read, and hear."4 If the com-
mercial speech does not solicit a crime and is not truly mislead-
ing, should the government still be able to prohibit it? An analy-
sis of this issue brings us back to Aristotle and Socrates.
V. MANIPULATING BEHAVIOR BY CONTROLLING ADVERTISING
A basic assumption of democracy is that adults are mature
enough to vote and determine the rules by which they will be
governed. The general public is entrusted with the power to de-
cide who the next President should be with access to the nuclear
button. Do we trust the people enough to let them be exposed to
non-misleading speech about lawful activities? Or is the power to
ban truthful advertising a useful weapon that has a rightful place
in the government arsenal?
We are not talking of the situation where the government
counteracts advertisements with more advertisements, such as
when the government uses advertising such as "[flriends don't let
friends drive drunk" to persuade people. Instead, we are talking
about the situation where the government counteracts adver-
tisements by banning them. The normal remedy for speech we do
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, §§ 1-2 (repealed 1933).
112. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
113. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, FREEDOM TO OFFEND FIGHTING WORDS:
INDIVIDuAL'S COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH (1995).
114. See, e.g., id.
2002]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
not like is more speech. However, the question here is whether
the First Amendment allows the government to enforce silence.
A. The Socratic Approach
Should the government be able to dampen interest in a lawful
product or service by making it a crime to truthfully advertise
that product or service? Do such restrictions on so-called commer-
cial speech violate basic principles of freedom of expression and
imply a lack of faith in the ability of individuals to reason, make
choices, and accept their consequences?
Socrates would not have trouble answering these questions be-
cause he rejected democracy." 5 He did not trust the people, be-
lieving instead that the people are not fit to rule themselves." 6 In
Socrates' view, it is "the business of the ruler to give orders and of
the ruled to obey."" 7 The governed are the "herd.""8 The "expert"
ruler treats his subjects (i.e., us) like a herd of cattle."9 Of course,
the cattle-tender in this metaphor is not the "Good Shepherd" of
the New Testament who cares for his innocent sheep like a father
and mother care for their innocent children. Rather, this rancher
views his cattle as steak and hamburger.2 ° Christians and Jews
speak of humans as the children of God; Socrates' metaphor
would treat humans as the pets of the gods.' 2 '
For Socrates, government exists not by the consent of the gov-
erned but by the submission of the governed.'22 In his ideal world,
the expert is the "one who knows," and, therefore should rule his
subjects.'23 Just as patients should obey the orders of the doctor,
115. See I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 12 (1988).
116. See id. at 12, 71-73, 116.
117. See id. at 12-13.
118. Id. at 15 (concluding that "[iun the Timaeus and its sequel, the Critias, Plato pic-
tured the Golden Age of man as a time when gods tended their human herds as men later
tended their cattle").
119. See id.
120. See id. at 17.
121. See XENOPHON MEMORABILIA AND OECONOMICUs 229-31 (E. Capps et al. eds.,
E.C. Marchant trans., 1918).
122. See id. at 229.
123. See id. at 17-18.
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and athletes should obey their coach, similarly, the multitude
should obey "experts," that is, "those who know how to rule."24
B. The Aristotelian Approach
Though he spoke about a century later, Aristotle's rebuttal of
Socrates was directly on point. His book, Politics, written over
2300 years ago, is full of contemporary insights.125 It is in this fa-
mous work that we find Aristotle's eternal epithet that man is a
"political animal." 26
Our word "political" comes from polis, the ancient Greek word
for "city."1 27 The ancient Greek city was not merely an urban area;
it was a sovereign city-state. 28 When Aristotle said that man is a
political animal, he meant that humans, unlike other animals,
are endowed with logos-the ability to speak, reason, make deci-
sions, distinguish right from wrong, and live together and par-
ticipate in a community.'29 We are not political animals because
we are avid viewers of Cable News Network and are obsessed
with the next election; we are "political animals" because we live
with each other in groups, in communities, and have the ability to
reason with each other. 30
In contrast to Socrates, Aristotle believed that people should
have the freedom to obtain information and exercise free
speech.'3 ' People can use this information and speech to reason
with each other and make decisions by majority rule. 32 Aristotle
believed people are fit to rule and decide for themselves. 133 It is
very likely that Aristotle was the harbinger of Chief Justice
Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products
Co. 13 It is in this footnote that Chief Justice Stone explained that
124. See id. at 229-31, 343-45.
125. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans., The Modem Library 1943).
126. STONE, supra note 115, at 10.
127. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA, THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE (1986) (discussing
the importance of language and the origin of words).
128. See STONE, supra note 115, at 9-11.
129. See id. at 10.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 92-93.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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laws restricting speech should be subject to "more exacting judi-
cial scrutiny" because such legislation "restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal
of undesirable legislation."'35
Plato played Boswell to Socrates. In the Platonic dialogue, Gor-
gias, Plato recounts how Socrates attacked the practice of oratory
and rhetoric as mere flattery of the common mob.'36 I.F. Stone's
book, The Trial of Socrates, explains that the unspoken premise
of the Socratic assault on oratory was disdain for the common
people of Athens, the so-called "mob."13 Socrates believed that the
rulers neither could nor should try to reason with "the herd."3 '
In contrast to Socrates' world view, Aristotle's Rhetoric argues
that leaders can influence people through reasoned argument be-
cause mankind possesses intelligence-the ability to reason.' 39
Indeed, at the very heart of democracy lies the faith in the peo-
ple-the vox populi."° Aristotle believed that "free government
has no future where men can be treated as a mindless herd.
Thus, from the very opening lines of the Rhetoric, we are in a dif-
ferent universe from that of the Socratic and the Platonic, and
breathe a different air. "141
Antiphon, like Aristotle, was a critic of Socrates and Plato. An-
tiphon spoke of the equality of man.'42 He placed great impor-
tance on the idea that the laws governing mankind should be cre-
ated with the consent of the governed. 4 3 This intellectual
ancestor of Jefferson anticipated our Declaration of Independence
by over two thousand years.'"
135. Id. at 152 n.4; see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 55, §§ 15.4, 15.7, 18.3, 20.7(a),
23.5.
136. STONE, supra note 115, at 91.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 16, 91.
139. See STONE, supra note 115, at 92. See generally JOHN HENRY FREESE, ARISTOTLE:
THE ART OF RHETORIC (T.E. Page et al. eds., 1967) (1926).
140. See STONE, supra note 115, at 92.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 43.
143. KATHLEEN FREEMAN, ANCILLA TO THE PRE-SOcRATIC PHILOSOPHERS 147-48
(1948).
144. STONE, supra note 115, at 43-44.
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C. The Framers and the Rejection of Philosopher-Kings
The Framers of the United States Constitution were well
aware of the debate between the followers of Plato and Socrates
and the followers of Aristotle. The Framers took an Aristotelian
view of the world. In The Federalist Papers, James Madison wrote
that the foundation of our government is based on the assumption
that man has the ability to reason, and that a democracy is a bet-
ter form of government because it relies on the reasoning of all
the people. 45 Madison explicitly rejected rule by philosopher-
kings.146 He wrote that
Itihe reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious, when
left alone; and acquires firmness and confidence, in proportion to the
number with which it is associated.... In a nation of philosophers,
this consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the laws,
would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened rea-
son. But a nation of philosophers, is as little to be expected as the
philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato.
47
In the often-cited civil liberties decision of Meyer v. Nebraska'
the Supreme Court acknowledged that life would be quite differ-
ent in America if our government was like Plato's ideal common-
wealth, or the city-state of Sparta (a military state that Plato and
Socrates admired). In both of these places, the Meyer Court
noted, the government sought "to submerge the individual and
develop ideal citizens."5 ° Meyer categorically rejected this aim be-
cause such "ideas touching the relation between individual and
State were wholly different from those upon which our institu-
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 258 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987). The au-
thorship of the various Federalist Papers is somewhat in dispute. See Douglas Adair, The
Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers, WII. & MARY Q. 3d Series 97-122 (Apr.
1944), pp. 235-64 (July 1944); cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (stating
that for the Court to roam rudderless, outside of the Constitutional and statutory text "is
to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher kings" (emphasis added)).
146. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 145, at 258; Ronald D. Rotunda, Bicentennial
Lessons from the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 21 SUFFoLK U. L. REv. 589, 604-10
(1987) (discussing Madison's beliefs during the framing of the Constitution).
147. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 145, at 258.
148. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
149. See id. at 401-02. Meyer invalidated a Nebraska law that prohibited the teaching
of any subject in a language other than English to pupils who had not passed the eighth
grade. Id. at 390-91. The law applied to every "private, denominational, parochial or pub-
lic school." Id. at 390.
150. Id. at 402.
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tions rest.... ."5 ' Other judicial precedent repeats this refrain.'52
Therefore, under decisions of the Supreme Court, Athens, not
Sparta, should be the American model.
VI. THE LEGISLATIVE APPLICATION OF ARISTOTLE
Often, but not invariably, America's legislative efforts have re-
flected the inherent worth of the common man and woman. When
federal legislation concerns subjects about which citizens can
form their own legitimate judgments, Congress has often rejected
a paternalistic approach. However, one must continue to recog-
nize that the philosophical triumph of Athens over Sparta will
never be complete, and debate on the issue is never-ending.
A. Using Children as a Justification for Regulating Adults
When the persons to be protected from undue coercion are not
able to make reasoned choices, the government has a greater duty
to regulate. Laws protecting children fall into this category be-
cause children do not possess the same level of reasoning ability
as adults. Thus, if it is illegal to sell a product (such as "adult"
magazines) to children, it should be constitutional to enact a
statute designed to prohibit store advertisement proclaiming that
it will sell children a product that is illegal for them to pur-
chase.'53
However, a state may not "burn the house to roast the pig."'54
The state law must be narrowly tailored and serve compelling
151. Id.
152. Cf Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
153. See e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a statute that de-
fined illegal "obscenity" in terms of an appeal to the prurient interest of minors). The
Court emphasized that the statute could not be overbroad; that is, it could not seek to pre-
vent the general public from reading or having access to materials on the grounds that the
materials would be objectionable if read or seen by children. Id. at 634 n.6. In addition, the
statute could not be vague. Id. at 643.
154. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (overturning a statute that made it
illegal to sell books which contained obscene language tending to corrupt the morals of
children). Even in the case of children, it would be one thing for a state to ban advertising
that is genuinely misleading to children; it is quite another to ban advertising because of
generalized concerns about children and their reasoning ability. See Irwin Toy, Ltd. v.
Quebec (Attorney-General) [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 1005-09 (Can.) (Beetz & McIntyre, JJ.,
dissenting).
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governmental interests. 5' A state, under the guise of child protec-
tion, may not constitutionally forbid the public from having ac-
cess to materials on the grounds that the materials would be ob-
jectionable if children read or saw them.156
In Butler v. Michigan,'57 the Court, without dissent, overturned
the conviction of a defendant accused of violating Michigan's ob-
scene literature statute. The statute made it an offense to dis-
tribute or offer for sale a book, drawing, photograph, etc., "tend-
ing to the corruption of the morals of youth."' The Court
believed that this statute restricted freedom of speech in violation
of the due process clause by reducing the "adult population... to
reading only what is fit for children."'59 Under the First Amend-
ment, the fact that ubiquitous children may see an "adult" book
or magazine is insufficient justification for severe restrictions on
its distribution.6 ' This type of ban could also have perverse ef-
fects. Remember the old adage: if you want to create a crowd to
watch a movie, first try to ban it.
Following the tradition of Butler is Sable Communications of
California, Inc. v. FCC,'6' in which the Supreme Court held that
Congress may constitutionally impose an outright ban on "ob-
scene" pre-recorded interstate commercial telephone messages
("dial-a-porn") because the protection of the First Amendment
does not extend to obscene speech.162 However, the Court invali-
dated the portion of the statute that imposed an outright ban, re-
gardless of age, on "indecent," i.e., "adult," dial-a-porn mes-
sages. 63 Thus, the government could ban such messages from
reaching children but not adults." The Court found that the
means used in the statute were improper because they were a to-
155. See NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 55, § 18.3 (explaining the standards of review
under the equal protection guarantee).
156. See Butler, 352 U.S. at 383-84.
157. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
158. Id. at 380; cf Ronald. D. Rotunda, Don't Blame Movies, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2000,
at A35 [hereinafter Rotunda, Don't Blame Movies]; Ronald D. Rotunda, Should States Sue
the Entertainment Industry as They Did Big Tobacco?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Oct. 30,
2000, at 41.
159. Butler, 352 U.S. at 384.
160. See id.
161. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
162. Id. at 128.
163. Id. at 116.
164. Id. at 128.
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tal legislative ban.'65 Instead, the means should have been nar-
rowly tailored to serve the purported interest in protecting chil-
dren.166 A more narrowly tailored solution to prevent indecent
dial-a-porn from reaching minors might include the requirement
of access codes, scrambling rules, and credit card regulations. 67
None of these techniques would directly regulate what someone
says, hears, reads or writes.
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.16 is an-
other example of a congressional attempt to prevent "obscene"
material from reaching minors by regulating speech about such
material. This case declared section 505 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 unconstitutional.'69 Section 505 provided that
cable television operators providing channels primarily dedicated
to sexually oriented programming must fully scramble or block
those channels.7 ° If they were unable to do so, television opera-
tors were supposed to limit their transmission to hours when chil-
dren were unlikely to be viewing.171
Because scrambling can be imprecise, audio or visual portions
(or both) of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen-a
phenomenon called "signal bleed."' 2 The purpose of section 505
was to shield children from hearing or seeing images resulting
from signal bleed, but the law at issue in Playboy was not nar-
rowly tailored.'73 To comply with section 505, the majority of cable
operators adopted the time channeling approach."'4 Under this
approach, for two-thirds of the day no household in those service
areas could receive the programming, even if the household or the
165. Id.
166. Id. at 130.
167. Id. at 128.
168. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
169. Id. at 827.
170. 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (Supp. V 1999).
171. Id. § 561(b). Later, administrative regulation set these hours to between 10 p.m.
and 6 a.m. FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 76.227 (2001). Playboy, 529 U.S. at
803.
172. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 803.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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viewer wanted to do so." 5 Playboy sued, challenging section 505's
constitutionality. ' 6
The Court held that section 505's content-based restriction on
speech violated the First Amendment because the government
could further its interests in less restrictive ways. 7 One plausi-
ble, less restrictive alternative could be found in section 504 of
the Act.'78 This section requires a cable operator, "[ulpon request
by a cable service subscriber... without charge, [to] fully scram-
ble or otherwise fully block" any channel that the subscriber does
not wish to receive on a household-by-household basis.'79 As long
as subscribers knew about this opportunity (targeted blocking),
section 504 would provide as much protection against unwanted
programming as would section 505.180 Thus, parents had the final
decision-making authority, not federal bureaucrats.
Because of the availability of targeted blocking, the govern-
ment failed to prove that section 505 was the least restrictive
means for addressing a real problem.'' The Court acknowledged
that many adults would find the Playboy material highly offen-
sive.'82 It also agreed that the government had legitimate reasons
for the regulation of the material because the programs came into
homes where children might see or hear them against parental
wishes or consent.' 3
The Court determined, however, that the First Amendment
protected Playboy's programming because the material was not
constitutionally obscene to adults."M In addition, section 505 was
a content-based regulation (even though it did not impose a com-
plete prohibition), and therefore it had to satisfy strict scrutiny.8 5
Under strict scrutiny, a restriction must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling government interest, and the government
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 813-15.
178. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504,47 U.S.C. § 560 (Supp. V 1999).
179. Id.
180. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 810.
181 See id. at 810-11.
182. Id. at 811.
183. Id.
184t See id.
185. Id. at 813.
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must use the least restrictive means to serve that interest.8 6 The
Court determined that targeted blocking would be less restrictive
than banning, and was therefore feasible and the most effective
means of furthering the government's compelling interest."7
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") claimed that
Hollywood is "deceptive" because it "markets" R-rated films to
children. 88 But what does it mean to "market" to juveniles, any-
way? For example, MetLife markets its insurance products using
Snoopy and other characters from the comic strip "Peanuts."
These characters can be seen on billboards, commercials and the
MetLife homepage selling life insurance, advising about wills,
and explaining the need for long-term care insurance.'89 Perhaps
the FTC should investigate MetLife to determine if the company
is trying to scare young children by talking about death and nurs-
ing homes. Maybe Hollywood and MetLife are conspiring to get
children accustomed to death so that they will be less reluctant to
attend scary movies.
The Court has made clear that the government lacks power to
ban or restrict material that is not constitutionally "obscene"; the
government's power does not increase simply because minors will
be part of the audience. 9 ' The protection of minors is an impor-
tant government goal, but the protection of the First Amendment
is also important. Following this idea, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals recently declared unconstitutional the Child Online Pro-
tection Act of 1998.'
186. Id.
187. Id. at 810-11. Justice Breyer argued in his dissenting opinion that section 504's
targeted blocking was not a similarly effective alternative because some parents might not
know of their section 504 opt-out rights. Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This argument
is interesting in that it is based on a presumption that adult parents are ignorant. Even if
one thinks parents are ignorant, a narrowly tailored rule would simply require the cable
operators to inform cable subscribers of their rights.
188. FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A
REVIEW OF SELF-REGULATION AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC
RECORDINGS & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
reportviolence/vioreport.pdf; see Ronald D. Rotunda, Don't Blame Movies, supra note 158,
at A35 (discussing the problems that occur when "politicians and bureaucrats start toying
with the First Amendment").
189. Metlife, http//www.metlife.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2002).
190. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811.
191. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000). Congress enacted the Child Online
Protection Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231, in response to the Supreme Court's invalidation
of the predecessor law in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Reno, 217 F.3d at 166. The
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B. Paternalism and Government Regulation: Some Examples
From Our History
1. Food, Drugs, and FDA Approval
When factors going into a decision are unusually complex, we
may choose to rely on the government for protection and guid-
ance. Congress created the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") to regulate the safety and effectiveness of new drugs be-
cause it believed that the factors going into decisions about the
safety of drugs require extensive experimentation and scientific
expertise.'92 Congress concluded that the ability to evaluate such
drugs may be outside the ken of the ordinary layperson; it there-
fore authorized the FDA to prevent the marketing of unsafe
drugs, or the marketing of drugs in a misleading manner.
9 3
The FDA does not, however, make the paternalistic decision to
deprive consumers of the ability to choose to buy foods high in fat,
cholesterol, sugar, or nicotine.'94 The law requires that food labels
truthfully list a product's ingredients so that consumers will be
able to make informed and reasoned decisions about what foods
to eat.'95 Various organizations and individuals can educate con-
sumers about the dangers involved with these foods, but there is
no paternalistic, governmental banning of them. More impor-
tantly, given that these products are legal, there should be no ef-
fort to ban nondeceptive advertising about them,'96 even though
Child Online Protection Act attempted to restrict material on the Internet that was for
commercial purposes and deemed harmful to children. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (Supp. V
1999).
192. JAMES T. O'REILLY, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMNISTRATION § 13.01 (1992).
193. Id.
194. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131-32 (2000) (hold-
ing that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate tobacco products as customarily
marketed).
195. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2000).
196. Over the years, various politicians have sponsored bills that would, in substance,
ban tobacco advertisements that use colors or pictures, thus permitting text-only adver-
tisements. Joanne Lipman, France Heartens Anti-Tobacco Advocates, WALL ST. J., Mar.
30, 1990, at B6 (discussing the effects that foreign restrictions on tobacco advertising will
have on the United States). However, the Supreme Court has held that a state may not
prohibit nondeceptive advertisements that use illustrations. See Zauderer v. Office of Dis-
ciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985) ('The use of illustrations or pictures in adver-
tisements serves important communicative functions: it attracts the attention of the audi-
ence to the advertiser's message, and it may also serve to impart information directly.
Accordingly, commercial illustrations are entitled to First Amendment protections af-
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many people say that they cannot stop eating potato chips, or
that commercials about ice cream make them crave fatty foods.
As a result, some of these people will suffer the ill effects of heart
disease, high blood pressure, obesity, and so forth.
2. The Federal Securities Laws
The securities laws of the United States offer another example
where our government has chosen to follow the democratic model
of Aristotle rather than the Platonic guardian/dictator model of
Socrates.' 97 Federal Securities laws mandate full disclosure of all
material information so that an investor can make an informed
judgment about whether to buy an offered investment. 9 ' The
government requires the disclosure of risks to assure that infor-
mation is true and complete.' 99 Because of these disclosures, in-
vestors, using the free marketplace, can decide for themselves
whether to purchase stock. °°
The government does not engage in "merit" review of invest-
ments. It mandates disclosure and does not govern substance.20 '
Investors decide for themselves whether to invest in tulips or
technology. Like most of the rest of the world,2"2 the United
States does not determine whether a proposed offering of stock
presents "excessive investment risk,"20 3 or is based "upon unsound
business principles."2 4
forded verbal commercial speech.").
197. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77z-3 (2000); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
198. See, e.g., Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Se-
curities, Securities Act Release No. 33-6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902 (Aug. 6, 1981).
199. See id.
200. See id.
20L See id.
202. But see LEWIS Loss & EDWARD COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 18 (1958) ("Only in the
United States and Canada, at the state and provincial level, are there rigorous substan-
tive standards governing the sale of securities."); see also id. at 17 (stating that "this kind
of paternalistic attitude toward the investor is peculiar to the United States and Canada").
On the federal level-as opposed to the state level in the United States or the provincial
level in Canada-there is no substantive review of the merits of securities offerings.
203. Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BuS. LAW. 785, 787
(1986).
204. WILLIAM CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1480 (4th ed. 1969).
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Some individual states engage in merit review of stock offer-
ings, but academics criticize merit review as a paternalistic and
ineffective method of protecting investors. °5 In general, more dis-
closure, and more speech is thought to be better than imposing
merit review, which attempts to weed out seemingly unsound in-
vestments.
3. Prohibition and Advertising Alcohol
In some cases, the United States has chosen the Platonic
rather than the Aristotelian approach to commercial activities.
Probably the most infamous example of the United States reject-
ing the strong tradition and belief in the democratic process was
Prohibition, the "Noble Experiment" of the 1920s. °6 The purposes
of Prohibition were certainly noble-to create a healthy, alert, so-
ber citizenry.2 7 The means to achieve this end-forced absti-
nence-were fatally flawed, based on a paternalistic assumption
using the model of the Platonic guardian/dictator.0 8
The people enacted the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohib-
ited the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liq-
uors within... the United States,"20 9 but the experiment was a
massive failure because it was based on the assumption that the
government should treat adults as if they were children. When
205. See, e.g., James S. Mofsky & Robert D. Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60
MARQ. L. REV. 367, 378 (1977) (an empirical study of merit regulation that compared se-
curities denied registration in a state that practiced merit regulation but that were al-
lowed registration in other states that did not engage in merit regulation). These securi-
ties were compared with securities that were allowed registration in a state that practiced
merit regulation; the authors determined that "on balance, returns on securities denied
registration were as high as those for securities registered." See also BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 42
(1984). Merit regulation has "often resulted in unnecessary economic barriers to the capi-
tal formation process." 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1882 (Oct. 7, 1983) (quoting Jack Bai-
ley, executive director of the Iowa Development Commission who stated, "[w]e have lost
jobs in Iowa and now we need risk capital to get the state going again. Merit review has
flagged those efforts because some companies don't want to put up with it"); see also Blue
Sky Red Tape, FORTUNE, July 1957, at 122.
206. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
207. IRVING FISHER, PROHIBITION AT ITS WORST 108 (1926).
208. See STONE, supra note 115, at 15.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
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they sobered up, the people enacted the Twenty-first Amendment,
which repealed the Eighteenth.21 °
The end of Prohibition caused fear that the people would turn
in massive numbers to "demon rum."21 In fact, despite the legali-
zation of liquor and the resulting explosion in liquor advertise-
ments, the number of drinkers increased by only ten percent.212
The mammoth enforcement efforts behind Prohibition made
hardly a dent in the number of American drinkers.213 But it did
serve to make criminals out of ordinary citizens and increase the
214power of organized crime. Indeed, the main legacy of the "Noble
Experiment" was the emergence of organized crime as a major
force in American life.215 Three-quarters of a century later, we
still are left with this unintended bequest.
Prohibition and the banning of liquor advertisements were not
the solution to prevent alcoholism. Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA")
has been proven to be a very successful method in treating alco-
holism.2 6 AA does not blame alcoholism on the manufacturers,
vendors, or advertisers of liquor.2 7 AA informs its members that
they are adults, and are therefore personally responsible for their
own choices.1 8 Any effort to blame third parties, according to AA,
is an improper exercise in denial.21 9
Modern society has chosen to deal with the issue of alcohol con-
sumption by educating people about its dangers-for example,
publishing research showing a statistically significant relation-
ship between drinking even a very small amount of alcohol and
breast cancer.220 This gives individuals the ability to decide for
210. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
211. See SAMUEL ELLIOT MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
516 (1965).
212. Andrew Kupfer, What to Do About Drugs, FORTUNE, June 20, 1988, at 39, 40.
213. Interestingly, in recent years, the public in the United States has voluntarily
turned away from hard liquor-not because of less speech (a ban on liquor advertisements)
but because of more speech (greater publication about the health dangers of excessive al-
cohol).
214. See MORRISON, supra note 211, at 900.
215. See id. at 901.
216. See A. Lawrence Chickering, Denial Hardens the Drug Crisis, WALL ST. J., July
25, 1988, at 6.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. John Noble Wilford, Moderate Drinking May Increase Risk of Cancer in Breast,
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themselves whether the risks are worth the benefits of moderate
consumption of alcohol.22' Today we seek to educate pregnant
women about the dangers of drinking while pregnant, but the
government does not ban liquor advertisements simply because
they might be viewed by pregnant women.222
However, old habits die hard. Consider the decision in Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co.223 The Rubin Court invalidated a federal law
that prohibited beer labels (but not wine and hard liquor) from
truthfully displaying the alcohol content.2" Why would the gov-
ernment forbid a seller from truthfully disclosing the alcohol con-
tent of the beer that it is selling?2 25 The government argued that
the ban was necessary to suppress the threat of "strength wars"
among brewers, who, without the regulation, would seek to com-
pete in the marketplace based on the potency of their beer.226
However, Aristotle and our Founding Fathers had more faith
in the people. Justice Stevens, concurring, stated in Rubin that
"the Constitution is most skeptical of supposed state interests
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government be-
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1987, at Al (referring to findings published in the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine that show that women have a higher risk of breast cancer if they take as
few as three alcoholic drinks a week).
221. The State of California implemented a multi-million dollar anti-smoking advertis-
ing campaign. See Seth Mydans, California Opens All-Out War on Tobacco and Its Market-
ing, N.Y. TMEES, Apr. 11, 1990, at Al. This alternative is consistent with the principle that
the best remedy for the speech with which we disagree is more speech, not less.
222. Indeed, some suggest that to make it a crime for a pregnant woman to drink may
raise questions about a woman's constitutional privacy rights. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973) (discussing the general scope of a constitutional right of privacy).
223. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
224. Id. at 488-89.
225. Justice Stevens stated that
[a] truthful statement about the alcohol content of malt beverages would
receive full First Amendment protection in any other context; without some
justification tailored to the special character of commercial speech, the Gov-
ernment should not be able to suppress the same truthful speech merely be-
cause it happens to appear on the label of a product for sale.
[There is no basis] for upholding a prohibition against the dissemination of
truthful, nonmisleading information about an alcoholic beverage merely be-
cause the message is propounded in a commercial context.
Id. at 492-93 (Stevens, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 488.
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lieves to be their own good."227 The Court declared the ban on the
truthful display of alcohol content to be unconstitutional.228
If the government had that same faith in the people that Aris-
totle and our Founding Fathers did-the faith that forms the ba-
sis of democracy-then it should not bar truthful speech about a
lawfully available product. The government would recognize that
if people knew that "ice beer" has a higher alcohol content than
regular beer, they could decide to drink regular beer if they pre-
ferred less alcohol. If people wanted a higher alcohol content, they
could turn to wine or distilled spirits.229 Federal law pursued an
opposite, inconsistent policy with regard to those liquors, and
permitted (indeed, required) the disclosure of alcohol content,
notwithstanding the alleged concern about strength wars.' ° We
should not be surprised to learn that alcoholics already knew that
hard liquor has more alcoholic content than beer, notwithstand-
ing the federal label restrictions.
VII. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL: WHY
POLITICIANS PREFER RESTRICTIONS OF TRUTHFUL SPEECH, OR
HOW TO HIDE THE TRUE COSTS OF REGULATION
It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the effort to discourage
and dampen the use of a lawfully available product or service by
forbidding or restricting an individual or corporation231 from en-
227. Id. at 497 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509
U.S. 418, 439-40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 358 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491.
229. The lower court in Rubin found, as a factual matter, that in the United States "the
vast majority of consumers... value taste and lower calories-both of which are adversely
affected by increased alcohol strength." Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355, 359 (10th
Cir. 1993).
230. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Alcoholic Content, 27 C.F.R. § 4.36
(2001), which provides in part:
(a) Alcoholic content shall be stated in the case of wines containing more than
14 percent of alcohol by volume, and, in the case of wine containing 14 per-
cent or less of alcohol by volume, either the type designation "table" wine
("light" wine) or the alcoholic content shall be stated. Any statement of alco-
holic content shall be made as prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section.
Id.
231. In the United States, a corporation is an incorporeal "person" for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394 (1896). Thus, it
is unconstitutional for a state to enact a criminal statute that forbids corporations from
spending money for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals. First
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gaging in truthful advertising related to that product or service is
simply another illustration of the age-old battle between privacy
on the one hand, and government intrusion on the other. It can be
seen as a struggle between self-determination-the right to make
private choices-and personal freedom on the one hand, and
George Orwell's Big Brother on the other. 2 It is between embrac-
ing the democratic assumption that people are fit to rule them-
selves and embracing the model of the Platonic guard-
ian/dictatorY.3
The purpose of restrictions on the advertising of truthful, non-
misleading, noncoercive commercial speech is typically to dampen
demand for a lawfully available product or service by forbidding
speech promoting or advertising the product or service.234 This is
an example of the government attempting to paternalistically
protect people from themselves by withholding information from
them. In Rubin, Justice Stevens recognized that one problem
with evaluating the justifications for banning commercial speech
is that "the Court sometimes takes such paternalistic motives se-
riously." 5
A belief in the democratic ideal rejects the view that the people
are the Platonic "herd" that the government must manipulate. As
Nael Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Corporations, like other persons, have the right
of free speech. A newspaper, for example, loses no rights under the United States Consti-
tution simply because its owners decide to incorporate. But cf, Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec
(Attorney-General) [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 956 (Can.).
232. See ORWELL, supra note 4, at 3.
233. It is because of this basic philosophical battle that groups such as the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") have opposed various proposed federal laws designed to
restrict alcohol and tobacco advertising. E.g., County Commission OK's Airport Ad Policy,
LAS VEGAS REV. J., Jun. 16, 1999, available at 1999 WL 9286375 (reporting that the
"Clark County Commission unanimously approved.., a once-controversial airport adver-
tising policy with amendments that satisfied First Amendment concerns of the ACLU."
For example, the airport "deleted provisions that banned advertising for alcohol and to-
bacco products."); Ira Glasser, Executive Director of the ACLU, HEALTH LETTER 6, Apr. 1,
1999, available at 1999 WL 13846860 (discussing the ACLU's long opposition to restric-
tions on commercial speech, including restrictions on tobacco advertising); Franklyn S.
Haiman, Is It Capitalism Versus Democracy? (reviewing ROBERT W. McCHEsNEY, RICH
MEDIA POOR DEMOCRACY: COMAUNI-CATION POLITICS IN DUBIOus TIMES (1999)), available
at 2000 WL 19325170.
234. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000) (prohibiting advertisement of cigarettes on any
medium of electronic communication).
235. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,498 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (cit-
ing United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 439-40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 358
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Douglas stated nearly a half century ago, "the State may
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract
the spectrum of available knowledge."236 That principle applies to
truthful advertising about legal services just as it applies to the
truthful advertising of other lawful products or services.
Restrictions on commercial speech are inconsistent with the
Aristotelian tenets that form the foundation of a democratic
state.237 Moreover, they lend credence to the Socratic belief that
the government should manipulate the "herd" by depriving the
people of information.23
Government regulation of commercial speech imposes hidden
costs in addition to the asserted benefits that attend governmen-
tal control of commercial activity. The majority of people (the
"herd") might reject a ban on advertising if they knew of the dis-
guised economic burdens such a regulation creates.239 If the legis-
lature does not hide the costs and benefits of a policy decision, but
instead fully reveals this information, the people likely will de-
velop faith in the legislature's rational weighing of interests.
If a state, for example, decides to regulate a particular product
by taxing it, the people are competent to weigh the advantages
with the disadvantages of such a decision. That competence is
part of the foundation on which democracy rests. A state legisla-
ture has wide discretion under the Constitution to decide to tax a
particular product, establish a regulatory body to collect a tax,
and then use that tax to subsidize another product.240 Normally,
the costs as well as the benefits of taxes are relatively open and
transparent to the people. Thus, the people accept the process
and the means by which their representatives reached the deci-
sion to tax, even though the people may not agree with it.
In contrast, the public's insight into legislative decisionmaking
suffers when legislators regulate truthful speech. The legislative
action is much less transparent. Because of the hidden burdens
236. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); see also Switzman v. Elbing
[1957] S.C.R. 285, 306 (Can.) (Rand, J.) (recognizing that freedom of expression is "little
less vital to man's mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical existence").
237. See STONE, supra note 115, at 50.
238. See id. at 74-75.
239. See, e.g., Joanne Lipman, Foes Claim Ad Bans Are Bad Business, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 27, 1990, at B1.
240. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1824).
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inherent in any regulation of speech, even the regulators may not
understand the full consequences of their regulation.24' At worst,
the legislature, by disguising its true objectives, may implement a
policy that the majority of people would oppose if they had re-
ceived adequate information about the true costs of the proposal.
The legislature, in short, might impose regulations that a major-
ity of the people would have rejected if they were cognizant of the
regulation's true burdens. Restrictions on advertising reflect an
anti-democratic means of implementing other policy judgments.
A simple example illustrates the point. A state legislature may
wish to assist less efficient pharmacies (or small, one-person law
offices) in their efforts to compete effectively with chain store
druggists who charge their customers less (or legal clinics, who
charge less by routinizing certain simple legal services, like sim-
ple divorces, as did the legal clinic involved in Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona).242 The legislature may achieve this goal in two very
different ways. First, it could place a special tax on these legal
drugs, thus raising their cost and lowering the incidence of their
use. To aid the less efficient druggists (or less efficient law firms)
the state could then grant outright subsidies to pharmacists who
have no affiliation with chain stores and have gross sales below a
fixed amount. The combination of a tax on all drugs and a subsidy
to the small, inefficient druggists would discourage drug use and
aid the small pharmacists.
To decide whether the advantages of discouraging legitimate
drug use and aiding certain favored businesses outweigh the dis-
advantages, the public would need only to compare the perceived
benefits of these goals with their costs. The public can measure
the costs of this legislative judgment in terms of higher taxes and
costs for consumers. The legislature would arrive at its decision
openly and, presumably, in a rational manner. Of course, the av-
erage voter will wonder why he or she has to pay more in order
241. After 1966, when the United States banned cigarette advertisements on television,
it became more difficult for producers of new low tar and low nicotine cigarette brands to
introduce their products. Also, when cigarette advertising left the airways, that departure
was accompanied by an exodus of anti-cigarette advertisements broadcast on television.
That hurt the anti-tobacco effort. Changing Fashions in Free Speech, WALL ST. J., May 18,
1976, at 20. Proponents of the ban did not anticipate this result, thus illustrating that old
adage: be careful what you wish, because it may be granted.
242. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Court held that the legal advertisements were constitu-
tionally protected. Id. at 383.
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for the state to give money to certain favored businesses. This
voter concern may explain why the legislature does not prefer
this open and transparent method.
Alternatively, the state could achieve its goal by prohibiting the
truthful advertising of drug prices (or prohibiting truthful adver-
tising of less expensive legal services that the legal clinics offer).
A prohibition on advertising discourages the workings of a com-
petitive market system and imposes transaction costs in the effi-
cient transfer of information, which should result in price in-
creases."3 More efficient drug stores would not be able to
advertise that the medicine they offer is less expensive. The law
might even prohibit the stores from responding to telephone in-
quiries. Consumers might collect the relevant information by vis-
iting several stores and comparing prices, but this method, of
course, is time-consuming and inefficient. In contrast, advertising
that informs the consumer of the availability of less expensive al-
ternatives of fungible products should generally lower prices.'
Indeed, lower prices should result even if the entire cost of adver-
tising is added to the price of the product and therefore passed on
to the consumer because increased demand may create economies
of scale.245
Advertising is not a free good. It costs money. Consequently,
people often assume that advertising increases the price of goods
in that its cost must be included in the final price of the goods
sold. However, advertising is different than the cost of raw mate-
rials that go into making a product. Raw materials are a variable
cost, but advertising is a fixed cost.246 To that extent, its effect on
the final price of the good will be less, if the advertising increases
the firm's output.' 7
243. STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO BE
DERIVED FROM STAFF'S RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO INCREASE RETAIL PRICE DISCLOSURES
FOR PRESCRIPrION DRUGS § III, at 109 (1975) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REP.]; Lee Benham,
The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 337 (1972); cf.
PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 48 (9th ed. 1973) ("In the idealized model of an efficiently
acting competitive market mechanism, consumers are supposed to be well informed");
Norman S. Buchanan, Advertising Expenditures: A Suggested Treatment, J. POL. ECON.
537 (1942).
244. See Buchanan, supra note 243, at 556.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 289. In the short run, the total cost equals total fixed costs plus total
variable costs. See id. at 289 fig. 7-1.
247. See ROTUNDA, supra note 40, § 1-6.5 (2000).
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Let us consider the example of an automobile. If the price of a
car drops 10% (perhaps there has been a decrease in the cost of
raw materials, such as steel, that go into manufacturing the car),
that does not mean that dealers will automatically sell 10% more
cars. Similarly, if the retail price of the car increases 10%, that
does not mean that the dealers sell 10% fewer cars.' If car prices
increase significantly, people tend to keep their old cars longer,
and may shift to alternative forms of public transportation. The
extent to which the price of cars is passed on to the consumer is a
function of variable demand. 9 If a product has a very elastic de-
mand, it is difficult for the retailer to pass on the increased costs
of manufacturing the item.250 In such cases the retailer will have
to absorb a lot of the cost, resulting in lower profit margins.2 5 '
Another way of thinking about the issue is to remember this basic
principle of economics-price is a function of supply and demand.
It is not a function of cost.25
2
Compare the cost of advertising cars (or advertising legal ser-
vices). The cost of advertising cars and the cost of the steel that
goes into the manufacturing of cars do not interact in the same
manner. Steel is a variable cost, but advertising is a fixed cost.
Each car that is manufactured uses a certain amount of steel.
Manufacturing more cars means using more steel. But more cars
does not necessarily mean more advertising. Therefore, manufac-
turing more cars does not automatically increase the cost of ad-
vertising.
Economists would assert that an increase in the cost of steel
shifts the automobile supply curve upward. Each increase in the
price of steel causes an increase in the cost of cars. The extent to
which this cost is reflected in the retail price of cars is a function
of the elasticity of demand and the degree of competition in the
248. The technical reasons for these effects are not obscure and may bear mentioning.
Two are especially important. First, depending on the degree of competition among sellers,
an increase or decrease in input prices might result in no change at all in the prices con-
sumers pay for the final output. Rather, there may be only a change in the profit levels of
settlers. Second, if a change in input costs does result in a change in input prices, the ex-
tent of the resultant change in the quantity of output demanded will depend on the "elas-
ticity of demand"--e.g., on the responsiveness of consumer demand to changes in that
good's price.
249. See DOMINIcKSALVATORE, MANAGERIAL ECONoMICS 388-89 (4th ed. 2001).
250. See id. at 389 fig. 9-2.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 394 fig. 9-4.
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industry. Because advertising is a fixed cost, its effect on the sup-
ply curve is quite different, and, therefore, elasticity of demand
does not wholly determine how much of the advertising cost can
be passed along to consumers. 3 The supply of cars is, in part, a
function of the cost of steel, not a function of the cost of advertis-
ing.
Once, when the law forbade commercial advertising of pre-
scription drugs, empirical studies of drug prices indicated that
there was less competition, and, thus, significantly higher drug
prices. 4 For example, an American Medical Association survey
in Chicago showed that the price of the same amount of the same
drug varied up to 1200%.255 Price disparities of this magnitude
would not exist in a market that permitted price advertisements,
because advertising facilitates both comparison-shopping by con-
sumers and competition by druggists. 256 The ban on advertise-
ments, therefore, increased drug prices and concomitantly dis-
couraged legitimate drug purchases.257 Therefore, the absence of
easily obtainable information about drug prices has helped insu-
late less efficient druggists from price competition.
In a sense, the result of the government restrictions on truthful
commercial speech is the same as the result of a tax on all drugs,
and a subsidy for certain favored druggists. In both cases, drugs
will cost more and certain druggists will receive government aid.
However, the impact of the method used to achieve this result is
decidedly different. It is comparatively more difficult for voters to
measure the true costs of the restriction on speech. It is hard to
put a dollar value on the cost of a law that prohibits advertising
prescription drug prices. On the other hand, it is comparatively
easier to understand the costs of increased taxes. If the legisla-
ture imposes a sales tax of 10%, then consumers know that the
tax is 10%.2"8 When there is a photo-op of a governor or other offi-
253. See id. at 388.
254. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
754 n.11 (1976).
255. Id.
256. Based on studies, a Federal Trade Commission staff study concluded that prohib-
iting the advertising of drug prices costs consumers millions of dollars. FTC STAFF REP.,
supra note 243, at 119.
257. Id.
258. All of that 10% will be passed on to the consumer if the demand is completely ine-
lastic. Otherwise, part of the cost is reflected in reduced volume of transactions. The point,
however, is that consumers will know that there is a sales tax of ten percent. This cost is
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cial giving a check to the favored druggists, the average voter
should understand what is happening. That is why the politicians
will prefer to restrict commercial speech rather than raise taxes.
There is less accountability to the voters.
If the true costs were known, the majority might prefer lower
drug prices. Restrictions on commercial speech obstruct the deci-
sion-making process, because the public can more easily weigh
the costs of subsidies and tax increases than it can weigh the
costs of limitations on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
This is true even though the ultimate economic results are the
same: higher drug prices.
In applying these basic principles to the advertising of legal
services, consider Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 9 In this case,
the Supreme Court upheld Florida regulations that prohibited
personal injury plaintiff-lawyers (but not defense-lawyers) from
soliciting employment by sending targeted direct mail to accident
victims and their relatives prior to the passing of thirty days after
the accident.26 ° If the state favored insurance companies in the
period immediately following an accident by making claimants
fair game for insurance lawyers (but not plaintiffs' lawyers) seek-
ing to settle the case quickly, such a rule would strike many peo-
ple as unfair.26'
Instead, the Florida Bar argued that it had a "substantial" in-
terest in "maintaining the professionalism of the members of the
bar," and that the "public's perception of, and confidence in, its
system of justice and those who administer it is critical to the
stability of a democratic society."262 The Supreme Court upheld
the Florida rule because it was designed, in the view of the major-
ity, to protect the "flagging reputations of Florida lawyers."263 The
visible. In contrast, in the case of a value-added tax, the cost is not visible.
259. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
260. Id. at 635.
261. See further discussion in, Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising,
and Free Speech In the Wake of Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REv. 703 (1997),
reprinted in 12 LAW. LIABILITY REV. 2 (No. 10, Oct. 1998) (part I), 12 LAw. LiABILrrY REV.
2 (No. 11, Nov. 1998) (part I), 12 LAw. LIABILITY REV. 2 (No. 12, Oct. 1998) (part III);
John Phillips, Note, Six Years After Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: The Continual Ero-
sion of First Amendment Rights, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 197 (2000) (discussing the ef-
fects Florida Bar imposed on First Amendment rights).
262. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (No.
94-226).
263. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 625. The majority in Florida Bar described the regulation
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Court stated that "[sIpeech by professionals obviously has many
dimensions."" Note, by the way, the Court's use of the word "ob-
viously" to justify its conclusion. 5
The holding applied only to targeted direct mail within the
prohibited time frame-thirty days-and not to other forms of
advertising, such as general or group mail advertising. 66 In
reaching this conclusion, the majority relied on empirical studies
about the image of the legal profession that supposedly justified
the Florida rule.2 67 This case marked the first time that the Court
upheld advertising restrictions based on the need to protect the
dignity of lawyers. In fact, the Court had specifically rejected this
purported justification in the past.2 6
A broader scope of judicial review should apply where legisla-
tive judgments are based on hidden costs than where the costs of
the legislative decisions are obvious. A court decision that re-
quires a legislative body (or a court, in issuing rules governing
the legal profession) to reveal the true expense of a decision does
not infringe on the legislature's (or court's) ability to make that
decision. This type of judicial mandate would not be anti-
majoritarian because it encourages an open decision-making
process. This process facilitates more rational legislative deci-
sions because it reflects the Aristotelian belief in the worth of the
common man. In contrast, the Platonic guardian/dictator would
have no qualms about manipulating the "herd."
as "an effort to protect the flagging reputations of Florida lawyers," and went on to say.
"[w]e have little trouble crediting the Bar's interest as substantial." Id. It is true that the
Bar also argued that it wished to protect the "privacy and tranquility of personal injury
victims and their loved ones from intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers." Id. at 624.
However, the Florida Rule was not well designed for that purpose because it allowed de-
fense lawyers or insurance adjusters to engage in intrusive, unsolicited contact.
264. Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
266. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 634.
267. Id.
268. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985). The
Zauderer Court stated:
[We are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity
in their communications with the public is an interest substantial enough to
justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights.... [Tihe mere pos-
sibility that some members of the population might find advertising embar-
rassing or offensive cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for
advertising that some members of the bar might find beneath their dignity.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,269 the Court held unconstitutional, as a viola-
tion of free speech, a state statute prohibiting pharmacists from
270advertising prescription drug prices. Similarly, in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona,271' Arizona gave constitutional protection to law-
yers who advertised the prices at which they would perform cer-
tain routine services. 2 These decisions are an important example
of the democratic quality of judicial review.
They do not impose substantive limitations on the legislature
(or court) implementing a policy, but, at the same time, Virginia
Pharmacy and Bates require a state to implement its policies
within a framework that is more conducive to a democratic deci-
sion-making process. As a result of Virginia Pharmacy, for in-
stance, a legislature must implement its commercial regulation
within a framework that is more likely to expose the true costs of
that regulation. 3
As the Court in Virginia Pharmacy recognized:
So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well in-
formed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indis-
pensable. [IMt is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent
opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.2' 4
Thus, the Court stated that the protection for commercial
speech serves the important First Amendment goal of
"enlighten[ing] public decisionmaking in a democracy."275 It is the
alternative to a "highly paternalistic approach" where the "State's
269. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
270. Id. at 770; see also Ford v. Quebec (Attorney-General), [19881 2 S.C.R. 712, 755-61
(Can.) (discussing United States Supreme Court decisions that have held that commercial
speech is entitled to less protection under the First Amendment).
271. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
272. Id. at 383.
273. Advertising restrictions that members of professional organizations agreed to
abide by would not violate the First Amendment (because there is no state action), but
they would still be illegal because they would violate the antitrust laws as a conspiracy in
restraint of trade. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 (1975).
274 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
275. Id. (footnote omitted).
20021
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advan-
tages of their being kept in ignorance."276
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission27"' followed Virginia Pharmacy. In Central Hudson, the
Court invalidated a state regulation that completely banned pro-
motional advertising by electric utilities.27 The purpose of the
regulation was to promote energy conservation by dampening
demand.279 Even if the purpose was laudable, the means were un-
constitutional.2 ° Though the state could have reduced electrical
consumption directly by taxing it, the state did not have the con-
stitutional power to ban advertising that merely promoted elec-
trical use.28' It was not valid for the regulators to argue that be-
cause they could ban or limit electrical consumption directly, they
could exercise the "lesser included" power of banning discussions
about increasing electrical usage.282
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court concluded that the choice "be-
tween the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of
its misuse if it is freely available" is the choice "that the First
276. Id.
277. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
278. Id. at 571.
279. Id. at 569-70.
280. Id. at 570-71.
281. Id. at 570.
282. In Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988), the Court stated:
[The] "greater-includes-lesser" syllogism... is blind to the radically different
constitutional harms inherent in the "greater" and "lesser" restrictions. Pre-
sumably in the case of an ordinance that completely prohibits a particular
manner of expression, the law on its face is both content and viewpoint neu-
tral. In analyzing such a hypothetical ordinance, the Court would apply the
well-settled time, place, and manner test. The danger giving rise to the First
Amendment inquiry is that the government is silencing or restraining a
channel of speech.
Therefore, even if the government may constitutionally impose content-
neutral prohibitions on a particular manner of speech, it may not condition
that speech on obtaining a license or permit from a government official in
that official's boundless discretion.
Id. at 762-64 (footnote and internal citations omitted).
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Amendment makes for us."283 To advocate the complete suppres-
sion of lawfully available products or services in an attempt to
dampen interest in such products or services is to reject the basic
Aristotelian premise of our democratic society that people have a
right to more information, not less, so that they can make well-
informed decisions.2"
Speech no longer sheds its First Amendment protections be-
cause of the fact that it is commercial in nature. Although the
state and federal governments may still impose reasonable regu-
lations on the time, place, and manner of speech (without regard
to the content of the communication), and although the regula-
tions may seek to discourage or prohibit false or misleading ad-
vertising, or the advertising of illegal products or services, a legis-
lature should be reluctant to suppress the dissemination of
truthful information about an entirely lawful activity. Allowing
such speech, rather than restricting it, serves to encourage more
rational majority decision-making. A state should not hide behind
the commercial speech doctrine.
The First Amendment protection that commercial speech is
now afforded by the Court does not forbid the legislature from
283. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
284. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 350 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (offering authority for the proposition that the state may ban tobacco adver-
tising that is specifically directed towards children or any other group for whom the pur-
chase of tobacco is illegal). A ban on such advertising already exists.
Posadas does not offer, outside the confines of the peculiar facts of that case, authority
to ban advertising. This point is discussed in NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 55, § 20.31.
During oral argument in Posadas, counsel for Puerto Rico argued that a casino advertising
in a Spanish language daily with ninety-nine percent local circulation would be permitted
to advertise casino gambling, so long as the advertising "is addressed to tourists and not
to residents" Ronald D. Rotunda, The Constitutional Future of the Bill of Rights: A Closer
Look at Commercial Speech and State Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C. L.
REV. 917, 926 & n.51 (1987) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, 478 U.S. 328
(1986) (No. 84-1903)).
Puerto Rican law already prohibited casinos from admitting persons under eighteen or
from offering their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico. Id. at 926. If the law in fact pro-
hibited Puerto Ricans from engaging in casino gambling, one should not be too surprised
that the Court upheld a ban on advertising that invited Puerto Rican residents to enter
the casino in order to gamble in violation of the law.
It is noteworthy that the majority in Posadas frequently cited Central Hudson with ap-
proval. Id. at 923. The Posadas Court gave no hint that it was in any way undermining
Central Hudson, a precedent only six years old. Justice Powell, who authored Central
Hudson, joined the majority opinion in Posadas. Id. at 921-29. Even the Puerto Rican
courts agreed that a total ban on advertising of casino gambling would be "capricious" and
"arbitrary." Posadas, 478 U.S. at 334-35.
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rewarding what the economists call "rent-seeking" activity-
seeking to persuade the government to give you something at the
expense of your fellow citizens-although it does make rent-
seeking a little more difficult.
In other words, if a state wants to make an activity or product
more expensive, or if it wants to aid a particular favored class of
people or certain economic interests (e.g., those groups with
greater access to the legislators), it may do so, subject of course to
other constitutional proscriptions. The state could implement
these goals directly and forthrightly, by taxes, subsidies, or by
statutorily authorized price-fixing, 85 or other similar devices.
However, the state should not seek to accomplish these results by
forbidding the discussion of (or the advertising of) information, or
through the restriction of advertisers from publishing billboards
or commercials designed to attract attention and to be easily un-
derstood.2"6 The state, in short, should not seek to prevent people
"from being convinced by what they hear."8 ' In a democracy, that
should be an anathema.
285. Federal anti-trust laws do not apply to price fixing by the state. Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 367-68 (1943); cf Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding
that certain state price-fixing activities such as setting a minimum fee for lawyers will not
be upheld).
286. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985) (holding that
a state may not constitutionally discipline an attorney who had solicited legal business by
running newspaper advertisements that included a drawing of the Dalkon Shield Intrau-
terine Device). The state prohibited legal advertisements that used illustrations. The law-
yer's advertisement contained illustrations, but none of the illustrations were deceptive.
The advertisement offered to represent women who had allegedly suffered from using the
Dalkon Shield. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 55, at 148-49.
287. Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 594 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
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